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Internal Tensions Hamper Full French Revival

PARIS—France is determined not to be invaded by Russia or subjected to its own Communist Party, but it fears it might become the battleground of a “hot” war as it now is, in the opinion of many Frenchmen, the battleground of the “cold” war. This seems to be the gist of French sentiment in the wake of declarations—inspired by the North Atlantic pact—by Maurice Thorez, chairman of the French Communist party, which cast doubt on the patriotism of French Communists. These statements, described by former Foreign Minister Georges Bidault as “national bigamy,” have led to the measures taken by Minister of the Interior Jules Moch against alleged Communist spies. The left-of-center but strongly anti-Communist newspaper *Franc-Tireur* has summed up one important current view by saying: “It would after all be paradoxical if, to prevent the Russians and Americans from coming to blows with each other, the French should come to fight among themselves, some in the name of the defense of the U.S.S.R., others in the name of the Atlantic Pact!”

Anti-Communist Measures

The French public, skeptical by nature and made still more skeptical by the series of convulsions that have marked our times, was not entirely taken unaware by the questions raised by Thorez, since it had long been assumed and publicly stated that the Communists looked to Moscow for their “party line.” Nor was Communist resistance to the North Atlantic pact unexpected, for it is obvious that from the point of view of the Krem-

lin the pact presents a greater potential threat than the Marshall plan. Perhaps unfortunately for purposes of clarifying foreign policy, it is felt here that the government’s suddenly more vigorous drive against the Communists was inspired, in part at least, by the elections scheduled for March 20 and 27.

In these elections, which are expected to give a more precise picture of the political configuration than has been recently available, it is in the interest of the government to deprive General Charles de Gaulle’s *Rassemblement du Peuple Française* (R.P.F.) of its principal propaganda weapon—its contention that the Queuille cabinet has not been sufficiently zealous in guarding the security of the French people at home and abroad.

The position of the government has unquestionably improved during the past six months. The cabinet is still constantly subject to fundamental differences of opinion between its principal component parties—the MRP, which is losing members to the R.P.F.; the Socialists, who tend to divide between Right and Left but are still a strong factor, and the Radical Socialists, who are staging a comeback. However, it has the great asset of being headed by a Premier who is an old hand at politics, and who has succeeded in steering his government through one tight spot after another. Many Frenchmen deplore the fact that Queuille lacks the dynamic qualities needed to assert France’s leadership in Europe, but generally it is conceded that the Premier is doing as well as can be expected in domestic affairs. Not only has

he held off the two extremist groups—the de Gaullists and the Communists—but he has restored at least a modest degree of public confidence, which has been lacking here for years.

This confidence was evidenced by the success of the recent internal loan, which brought 100 milliard francs (approximately \$315 million) of new money into the coffers of the state. The economic recovery of France, which is particularly striking to one coming here after an absence of three years, has materially aided the stabilization of the government. With the marked increase in agricultural production, food prices are declining here as elsewhere. This causes grumbling among the peasants, who grew rich during the war and postwar years, but will be welcomed by city dwellers as soon as the fall in wholesale prices is reflected in retail trade, which so far is only partly the case. In this connection, much criticism is being directed against middlemen who are accused of creating a bottleneck in the economy.

Once prices of food and other necessities in the cities have been adjusted downward, there will be less reason for labor union demands for higher wages—and in fact the non-Communist labor groups, the *Force Ouvrière* and the Catholic unions, have already made clear that they are interested in improvement not of money wages, but of real wages.

Is Communism Declining?

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that communism has yet been effectively checked in France. The Commu-

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nist party, which suffered a considerable loss of prestige as a result of the unsuccessful coal strike last fall, is now in process of reorganization and "purification." It is closing its ranks in the expectation of stiffer resistance by the government, getting rid of recently acquired members who are regarded as unreliable and creating a hard core of determined followers. The prevailing view is that communism continues to exert a powerful attraction on the younger generation and on the intellectuals—not because of any love for Russia or of a desire to create a political dictatorship in France, but because in a period of profound moral

confusion communism appears to offer a firm belief one can cling to. This is especially true of young people who are filled with the ardor natural to their age to participate in public life and do some good but are little attracted by moderate political parties, most of which are headed by prewar leaders like Léon Blum and Eduard Herriot. Nor is it a coincidence that some devout Catholics have shown sympathy with the aims, if not the methods, of communism.

This situation causes thoughtful observers, both French and American, to feel more and more that the fundamental problem of France, of all Europe, and of

humanity in general, cannot be seen in terms merely of economic recovery or military security against Russia. It is essentially a moral problem—how to find a new objective for the aspirations of mankind compatible with the humanistic traditions of Western civilization. The question no longer is whether France or other Marshall plan beneficiaries will have enough to live on by the end of ERP, but whether they will have something to live for.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(First of three articles on current trends in France.)

Military Influence On U.S. Foreign Policy Diminishing

WASHINGTON — President Truman's announcement that on March 31 Col. Louis A. Johnson will replace James V. Forrestal as Secretary of Defense foreshadows the gradual ending of direct participation by the military authorities in the making of foreign policy. Mr. Forrestal's interest in international political relations almost equals his concern with military matters, but Col. Johnson's interest centers on the particular responsibilities of the Defense Department.

The contraction of the military role in the conduct of foreign policy has already begun, although it is far from complete. The State Department announced on March 2 that it was disbanding the office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Area Affairs, through which the Secretary of State since 1946 has communicated to the Army Department his policy instructions drawn up to guide the military officers who actually control the occupation of Japan, Germany, Austria, Korea and Trieste. The department recalled Robert D. Murphy to Washington to handle German and Austrian affairs, and it assigned Japanese matters to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Mr. Murphy, a career diplomat, has been political adviser to the United States Military Governor in Germany since 1945.

These changes mean that the department is already carrying out the recommendation of the Commission for the Organization of the Executive Department of the Federal Government, which advocated that the Secretary of State instruct the military commanders in the occupied areas directly instead of through the Military Establishment. The department may go one step further and assume

responsibility for the administration of the occupied areas. The assignments of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, United States Military Governor in Germany, and of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, are likely to end before 1950.

Military Problem

Relief from responsibility for political policy in the occupied areas will enable Col. Johnson to devote himself to the problems of his department without the distractions from which Mr. Forrestal has suffered. His chief problem is to persuade the country that it should decide what American military policy should be; the conflict between Army, Navy and Air Force in the Defense Department has prevented the Secretary from getting at the roots of that issue. The termination of the costly discord in the services depends partly on the degree of success Col. Johnson will have in establishing unquestioned civilian control over the military agencies. The report on the National Security Organization which the Commission for the Organization of the Executive Branch submitted to Congress on February 26 declared that, under present circumstances, "each military branch follows its own purposes and, due both to the weakness of the Defense Secretary's powers and to the confusion of authority over them, has very much a free hand," with a resulting "failure to assert clear civilian control over the armed services."

The commission protested that "extravagance in military budgets and waste in military expenditure show a serious lack of understanding of the effect of

military costs and spending upon the total economy. . . . We must hold the military rigidly accountable to the President, the Congress and the people. We must do this not only to safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism, but to insure that military policy shall be in close accord with national needs and national welfare."

Sharing the opinions of the commission, President Truman on March 5 requested Congress to legislate as the report suggests. Only a new law, changing the "unification act" of 1947, will enable Col. Johnson to capture full control for civilians over the National Military Establishment, which is federated without being actually unified. Under the present statute the commission has told Congress, "the Secretary of Defense has only 'general' authority over the service departments. He cannot hire and fire subordinates except on his immediate staff. Almost all appointive power not in the President's hands is in that of the subordinate service secretaries. The powers of the Secretary of Defense over the budget for the National Military Establishment, and over expenditures, are inadequate. He is inadequately provided with staff and has no authority to reorganize the Establishment, most of whose machinery is rigidly prescribed by statute." The commission accordingly recommended that "the principle of unified civilian control and accountability be the guiding rule for all legislation concerned with the National Military Establishment and that full authority and accountability be centered in the Secretary of Defense, subject only to the President and the Congress."

The effective reform of the Defense Sec-

retariat could strengthen the American position in world affairs by lessening the possibility of overstress on the importance of purely military considerations in making foreign policy. "True national security depends more upon economic stability and political strength than upon military power," the commission stated. In line with that opinion, the commission repeated, in the report on the National Security Organization, the recommendation it made in its report on General Management of the Executive Branch, that the President be authorized by law to appoint whatever members he wants to the National Security Council, which

now controls decisions about foreign policy. Existing law prescribes that the membership consist almost wholly of heads of the military agencies. "The President's authority has been curtailed by statutory stipulation of the membership and duties of . . . the National Security Council," the commission concluded. The preliminary report made to the commission by its committee on the National Security Organization observed that "the proper functioning of the National Security Council is fundamental to the success of the entire security structure," since its task is "to weigh our foreign risks and commitments against our domestic and

military strength and bring them into realistic balance." When the council is unsoundly organized, however, "in default of political guidance, the military may, in effect, determine foreign policy."

Although the military establishment continues to control political policy relating to the Pacific islands formerly mandated to Japan, revision of the National Security Council could remove from the office which Col. Johnson is about to assume the last vestige of major responsibility for primary decisions about international political affairs.

BLAIR BOLLES

China's Peace Talks Continue; Renewed War Possible

Speculation concerning the possibility of peace between the Chinese Communists and the Nanking regime of acting President Li Tsung-jen has been growing in recent weeks. Late in February Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai received an unofficial Shanghai peace group, which included a member of Li's official peace delegation. Subsequent reports from Nanking and Shanghai suggest that these preliminary talks are to be followed by formal Communist-Nanking discussions. However, many serious difficulties remain in the way of an agreement, and it is entirely possible that a new phase of the military struggle may soon begin.

Background of Negotiations

In watching the daily moves on China's political chessboard it is important to understand who holds the pieces. The outstanding fact is that the Communists have won the area in which the civil war of the past few years has been fought; they have destroyed, captured or scattered the principal anti-Communist armies and have acquired vast stores of American material once held by the opposing Kuomintang troops.

Linked with this is a second major fact: the marked state of disintegration of the Central government. Provincialism is again rampant in non-Communist territory, and the Kuomintang is a house divided. From Nanking Li Tsung-jen and his associates operate, while Canton has been a center for Sun Fo and his group. Sun's resignation as Premier on March 8 is a distinct victory for Li. Meanwhile, behind the curtain of "retirement," Chiang Kai-shek is playing an active role,

working to build up a military base in Southeast China and Formosa. Before leaving Nanking he saw to it that generals loyal to him held certain key areas. Chiang's continuing power has, in fact, been pointed up by the recent closing of a Nanking newspaper and the arrest of its editor for suggesting that Chiang cease interfering in Chinese politics from behind the scenes.

A third crucial consideration in present-day Chinese politics is the universal desire of the Chinese people for a quick peace and the disappearance of almost all popular support for the Kuomintang. Roger Lapham, ECA Administrator for China, suggested these developments when he declared on February 18 that China's masses are not interested in the question of potential Communist domination of the country, but "just want to be let alone." Part of the picture, also, is the fact that China's political center is, in American terms, far to the left of center, and that the Communists have won the support, or neutralized the opposition, of a major segment of the politically conscious, non-Communist population.

Communists and Peace

All these factors leave Li Tsung-jen only with certain tactical counterweights: the possible value of a peace agreement in helping a new government to take over the administration; the various advantages of not having to fight, even briefly, for the territory for which Li can speak, and so forth. On this basis Li and his associates presumably are seeking to bargain for political survival. But the Communists have shown suspicion of Li's peace proposals and have indicated in many state-

ments that they are determined on a peace which will make it impossible for the leadership they have been fighting to take up arms again, or to establish itself inside a new Communist-led coalition government.

The official Communist peace program was enunciated in an eight-point statement by Mao Tse-tung on January 14. Attacking Chiang Kai-shek's New Year's Day peace offer as "sheer hypocrisy" designed to win "a breathing space," he demanded, among other items, punishment of Kuomintang "war criminals," abrogation of the "bogus Constitution," agrarian reform, reorganization of "reactionary armies," abrogation of "treaties of national betrayal," and convocation of a "political consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements," to "establish a democratic coalition government" and take over all power from the Kuomintang. Subsequently, the Communists sought to promote local peace settlements on the model of their Peiping settlement with General Fu Tso-yi. Under this arrangement Fu gave up the city late in January, and the Communists intimated that he would be removed from their war-criminals' list.

Policy of the Powers

The policies of the three major powers will affect Chinese developments in many ways. The British, who avoided committing themselves thoroughly to the Kuomintang in the civil war, apparently hope to play an important part in foreign trade with a Communist-led China, benefiting from the use of Hong Kong as a base. The Russians, who are in a most favorable position for close relations

with a new Chinese regime, have recently aroused discussion as a result of negotiations with the present Nationalist government for economic concessions in the Northwestern province of Sinkiang, long an area of Soviet interest.

For many months the main trend of United States policy in China has been to undertake no new commitments (while continuing to disburse parts of last year's \$400 million ECA appropriation), and to cut some past links with the Kuomintang. This is presumably the meaning of the cold reception to Mme. Chiang's aid mission last year and the withdrawal of the American military mission from China. On the other hand, there have been certain countertendencies within the Administration—for example, ECA's interest in surveying aid prospects in Formosa and Roger Lapham's reference to the possibility of appropriating \$240 million in "economic" aid for Kuomintang China. There has also been pressure from a large group of Republican Congressmen and some Democrats.

The State Department's policy of semi-disentanglement seems to have been based partly on the assumption that Kuomintang China is beyond effective help, partly on the belief that there is a powerful Nationalist element in Chinese communism, which might be encouraged along "Titoist" lines by such an approach, and partly on the desire to "wait and see" how events develop in China. It cannot, however, be taken for granted that this approach means the end of all American assistance to the Kuomintang. What is clear is that the decision reached on this question will go far to determine our future relations with the Chinese people. The available evidence indicates that the vast majority of politically conscious Chinese have reacted strongly against postwar American assistance to Nanking. One of the principal reasons for this attitude has been the conviction that United States aid has encouraged civil war in China.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

(Published in co-operation with the American Institute of Pacific Relations where Mr. Rosinger is a Research Associate and a member of the Editorial Board of its fortnightly publication, *Far Eastern Survey*.)

News in the Making

Negotiations now being conducted in London by the deputies of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the conclusion of an *Austrian peace treaty* are putting Yugoslavia in a delicate position. Should the Tito regime press its claims against Austria, or agree to abandon them, it might weaken its internal position, especially among its Slovene population, thus rendering itself more vulnerable to Cominform and Soviet pressure. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia is to obtain a relaxation of economic restrictions in its trade with the United States, it will have to meet the slight concessions offered by Washington with compromises of its own. . . . Several Latin American countries have indicated concern over Peru's failure to observe the principle of the *right of asylum*, a mitigating factor in Latin American revolutions, in the case of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Haya, chief of the now illegal Peruvian APRA party, has been under protection of the Colombian Embassy in Lima since January 3. The Odría government has refused the Colombian request for safe-conduct for Haya on the ground that he must be brought to court for political crimes. . . . Israel advanced toward *membership in the UN* when the Security Council approved its application by a vote of 9 to 1 March 4. The General Assembly is also expected to act favorably after it reconvenes April 5. . . . Climaxing a long struggle to remove racial discrimination from *American immigration and naturalization laws*, the House of Representatives on March 1 passed by an overwhelming majority the Judd bill which extends the quota principle to peoples hitherto excluded on a racial basis, notably the Japanese, Koreans, Malays and Polynesians. The Senate—where the outcome of a detailed study of the whole immigration law may cause a major delay—has yet to pass on the measure. . . . The inter-American conference to *eliminate colonialism in this hemisphere* will open March 15 in Havana without the United States. This controversial committee is the result of a 1948 Bogotá conference resolution.

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

UTICA, March 14, *Colonial Africa Looks at World Politics*, Albert H. Garretson

*NEW YORK, March 19, *North Atlantic Pact—Will It Make for Peace or War?*, George Fielding Eliot, Juliusz Katz-Suchy

PROVIDENCE, March 20-27, *12th Annual World Affairs Week*, Hilda Yen, Joseph C. Harsch, Sir Norman Angell, Roger N. Baldwin, Edwin M. Martin, Kumar Goshal, Ugo Carusi, John C. Ross, William A. Higginbotham, Raymond W. Logan and others

*BOSTON, March 21, *Nationalism, Imperialism, Communism in Southeast Asia*, J. D. L. Hood, Charles Wolf, Jr.

*BUFFALO, March 21, *U.S.-U.S.S.R.*, Harry Schwartz, John C. Best, William D. Hassett, Jeremiah D. Wolpert

PITTSBURGH, March 22, *Soviet-American Future*, Quincy Howe

CINCINNATI, March 23, *Western Union*, John Wilmot

PHILADELPHIA, March 24, *Asia's Revolt Against Colonialism*

DETROIT, March 25, *UNESCO or Fiasco*, Malcolm Bingay, W. C. Trow

*Data taken from printed announcement

Social Forces in Southeast Asia, by Cora Du Bois. Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 1949. \$2.00

The complex situation in Southeast Asia, where nationalist movements and social transformations compounded with Marxist ideology are creating acute problems for the Western colonial powers, is illuminatingly presented in this timely little study by an eminent anthropologist who now heads the Southern Areas Branch, Office of Intelligence Research in the Department of State. Dr. Du Bois describes with great penetration some of the social changes that are taking place in reaction to the diffusion of European cultural influences.

War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, from Casablanca to Tokio Bay, January 1, 1943-September 1, 1945. Compiled and edited by Louise W. Holborn. Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1948. \$6.00

In 1,278 pages this book completes the two-volume work which has brought together a mass of speeches, declarations and agreements that gave expression to the objectives of the UN during the exigencies of war and help explain some of the divisive issues now occupying world attention. The wealth of documentary material here presented is made even more invaluable for the student of public affairs by the full bibliographic citations and the chronologies which precede each section.

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